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(20 January 1998) 
Geoff Eley teaches history at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Ar-
bor, and is a recognized expert on 
nationalism from the dawn of the 
Enlightenment era to the present. 
Eley is the author of Reshaping the 
German Right: Radical Nationalism 
and Political Change after Bismarck 
(London and New Haven, 1980), 
From Unification to Nazism: Reinter-
preting the German Past (London, 
1986), and Kontinuitiit in 
Deutschland (Munster, 1991), and is 
co-author with David Blackboum 
of The Particularities of German His-
tory: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Gennany (Ox-
ford, 1984). He has also edited with 
Ronald Gregory Suny a book en-
titled Becoming National: A Reader 
(Oxford, 1996). 
Eley visited the University of 
Kentucky campus in January of 
1998 to discuss nationalism, with 
particular emphasis on Germany. 
He took some time from his busy 
schedule to discuss various aspects 
of his work on nationalism with a 
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disClosure interview team. We began with a discussion of an interesting 
comment in the introduction to Becoming National, concerning Eley's 
call for cultural recovery and the celebration of difference. Our conver-
sation then led quickly to further questions about Eley's position re-
garding Habermas, and to an elaborate and sometimes personal 
discourse on how the postmodern era, both in its academic and his· 
toric/national guises, has complicated the work of many historians. 
Historical Geneology and Nationalism 
disClosure: We would like to open this discussion with a question 
about Germany and its so-called Sonderweg, or "special path," to na· 
tionhood. You seem to suggest in some of your works that this phrasing 
implies an illegitimate ideal of how a nation should develop. 
Geoffrey Eley: Exactly. My resistance to calling Germany's history pe-
culiar comes from the conviction that national histories need to be dis· 
engaged from developmental schemas that imply sequential movement 
from lower to higher s tages. As you point out, I've spent a lot of time 
dismantling the extraordinarily well-entrenched comparative frame· 
work that sees German "misdevelopment" in relation to a particular 
idealization of British and French history. And if we follow the logic of 
that critique through, then this presumption of an ideal form of nation-
building, or of the nation, makes no sense. Part of my default approach 
is some notion of combined and uneven development. Whichever par-
ticular examples we choose, the global or transnational contexts will al-
ways exercise a profound impact on how processes of national state 
formation and political development are able to work themselves out. 
So the implicit logic of developmental approaches to these questions, 
which treat each nation as a discrete entity, seems to me flawed. Of 
course, it's really hard to get out of that trap. 
dC: You mean the trap of an evolutionary schema? 
GE: Yes. Very difficult. 
dC: But even if one avoided an evolutionary perspective, keeping in 
mind your skepticism about treating nations as discrete entities, what 
are we to make of ethnicity? Because ethnicity is cited now, not only by 
observers, but by participants in struggles for nationhood such as those 
that have occurred in the former Yugoslavia. So doesn't ethnicity need 
to fit into the framework of nation-forming as that which is proposed to 
make a particular nation distinct. 
GE: Well, that's really part of the problem, you see. If you look at the 
history of nationalism, it's actually a very short history. And ethnicity 
has only played a part in that history relatively recently, taking over in 
the late nineteenth century for the political values of citizenship made 
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common parlance by the French Revolution. ~at's n~t to deny that 
ethnicity plays a role in the sort of struggles you re ta~ng about, b~t I 
would want to be as specific as possible about the particular valencies 
of the appeals to ethnicity. I'd want to see how the pri~~cy a':~ ex.clu-
sivity of ethnic loyalties have been ~ecured, how ethnic. identifications 
have been mobilized so effectively in former Yugoslavia (to use your 
example) that now they appear to have displaced other solidarities and 
antagonisms from the field. 
dC: What kinds of change are the post-communist parts of the world 
facing? 
GE: There are two main points about post-communism to keep in 
mind. First, the regional framework of transnational politics in the 
former Soviet Union must be understood not only in relation to the 
forms of Russian hegemony and the old Soviet imperium, but also via 
the frameworks of interregional cooperation and consciousness. Sec-
ond, that kind of transnational context has been replaced by a series of 
other nascent logics such as marketization and European integration. 
Basically, the collapse of those regimes and the political traditions that 
carried them has opened up a space in which all sorts of things can hap-
pen, most importantly new national identifications. The reintroduction 
of national politics is the most obvious new departure. 
dC: How do these new nationalisms relate to cultural identities? 
GE: The kind of historical genealogy I want to create for understanding 
where nations and nationalism come from begins with popular sover-
eignty, national self-determination, citizenship, and democracy. But in 
addition to these characteristics there are a whole culturalist set of lan-
guages for understanding nations. Nations are not only composed of 
citizens but people who bear the same culture as well (whether we 
think that through in terms of ethnicity or something else). 
dC: Does that mean one nation, one ethnicity? 
GE: No. This assumption can be historically dismantled. Initially, in the 
context of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, nations were 
defined by citizenship, and nationalism was associated with popular 
sovereignty and a political category of citizenship. Ireland, Poland and 
Greece are good examples of this. In a lot of ways, Greece is the most 
interesting case: the inventors of Greek nationality thought in terms of a 
Balkan-wide identity. This projects a political future completely blin.d 
to cultural differences. So only further into the 19th century does this 
notion of Greece, or of nation-building more generally in Europe, get 
grounded in arguments about a cultural identity linked to language, re-
ligion, territory, and ethnicity. 
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How we answer this question also depends on which particular world-
historical moment we're looking at. Figuring out the relationship be-
tween a cultural formation (like ethno-national identification) and the 
longer drawn-out developmental processes (whether we do that in 
terms of capitalist development and the logics of economy, or in terms 
of class-formation, or by the creation of unitary societies by some other 
analytic), is incredibly complex, and how we characterize this relation-
ship (between culture and economy, or culture and society) will also be 
influenced by the dialectics of boundedness and territorialization 
within an international state system. Judging the valency of ethno-na-
tional solidarities will require very different approaches depending on 
when we enter this wider process of global development, between the 
French Revolution and now. For me, the best way of handling these 
questions of general history is to think in terms of European-wide mo-
ments of concentrated change. By this I mean those fairly rare conjunc-
tures when European history is genuinely European, when the 
landscape is being remade, in all possible dimensions: political, legal, 
social, cultural, intellectual. So the key notion is one of continental, 
transnational, convulsive revolutionary change, where constitutions 
are actually being created, states are being reshaped, and everything 
from territorial changes and institutional innovations to fundamental 
political realignments and the fashioning of new social blocs is taking 
place. This is what I'd call a "constitution-making moment", where the 
transformations are generalized and societal, and where the making of 
new constitutions in the literal sense usually has a central place. 
dC: Could you explain a little more about what you mean when you 
speak about "world historical moments" and the "transnational?" How 
do these moments fit into your methodology? And do they occur often, 
or only very rarely? 
GE: There are only a few such periods during the past two hundred 
years or so. I would include the French Revolution, the 1860s, the peri-
ods at the end of the First and Second World Wars, and most recently 
the years 1989-92. Those are the points from which we can develop a 
larger contextual argument for Europe as a whole in this transnational 
sense, which makes it much easier to handle the meanings of nation-
hood in a particular place. If we do that, then the terribly abstract defi-
nitional discussions that tend to develop when we're dealing with 
nation, ethnicity, and all the related concepts, are much easier to sort 
out. So when you ask me, for instance, How should we handle these 
questions in the breakup of Yugoslavia, I want to step back and con-
sider in the first instance this transnational arena of change, and give 
those processes of dissolution their conjunctural and Europeanwide 
contexts, to explore them on a transnational scale. I'd want to consider 
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set of structures in light of the logics 
the unraveling of a conte~porary t f transnational change, which 
d d · the previous momen ° d f institute uring t f the foundation of states at the en o 
in this case means the mo;e~ ~hen need to elaborate our analysis of 
the Second Worl~ W~r. e . . ostwar radicalism, the dy-
1943-47 via the histories of .anh-fasctr1sm,ti.Pon the normalizations of the 
. 1 d economic recons uc , namics of soc1a an. ies of the USSR and USA, and so on. 
Cold War, the ~eg1ona~ hegem.c: started. You can't begin with any one 
It's quite complicated, 1ust getti g d. f the whole. So it seems to 
t get an understan mg o . 
piece and presume o . d . both persuasive narrative about 
me that we get furthest m pro .ucmg tual framework for that kind 
. h' d a comparative concep . . al 
national 1story an . .th. this sort of world-historic 
.f ·tu te our questions wi m . . 11 
of work i we s1 a f ti. al change constitutiona y 
Th . moments o transna on . . frame. ese ma1or . f h w politics can proceed m particu-
lay down the set of coordinates or o 1 enerations actually, until we 
lar national settings, for the next severa g ' 
come to the next transnational moment of change. t 
. that the most recent momen s 
dC: Would it be appropriate, then, to ~ay the nations of Eastern Europe 
of transnational chan.ge set t~e ~ta~e or f talking something your ter-
to enter into modernity? Or is t a way o 
.d? minology is designed to avm · · 
. those terms in that way. Moderruty 
GE: I'm pretty hesitant about :is1ng ti t m because it implies exactly a 
in this context is a hugely P:0 em;n~ i;:e~ms to me that however per-
movement from lower to higher. t• f modernity in that sense, as 
hi · · a concep 1on o suasively we can stoncize · b tween the Enlight-r . the two centuries e 
a useful way of conceptua t~mg that usa e has been compre-
enment, the French Revolution and todar, I me~ts of the last two 
hensively destabilized by t~e ~eory ld e:~eo~vents we've been trying 
decades. as well as by even.ts mt e :~rif it made sense to conceptualize 
to theorize by postmodern1sm. So~ ti of the modern that frame-
the last two hundred years throug a ; 0 on by both thedry develop-
work has been cast into enor~ou~ h1sarray ou're suggesting might be 
ment and by the very transnationa c ange Y k 
. · ·th· n that framewor . an appropriate object of inquiry wt i . . ll 
. uch as modernity m a dC: So, would you be wary of using terms s 
cases? . . . 
. it's become possible to h1stonc1ze a 
GE: Yes and no, b.ecause m a sense oint of the present much more 
notion of modernity from the vantage ~h I came into all this in the 
easily now than, say, thi~ty years a~o. . e~on already seemed incred-
1960s, notions of modernity and mo em
1
iza t ·nevitably embedded in 
. . b they were a mos i 
1bly problematic, ecau~e . ,, of the ahistorical and techno-
frameworks of "modernization theorr 1960 We already realized that 
cratic kind dominant in the 1950s an s. 
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this incredibly schematic and inevitablist understanding of where his-
tory was headed was difficult to maintain. These developmental 
schemas were also horribly contaminated by the imperialisms behind 
them. So it was axiomatic for many of us back then that this way of 
thinking about history made no sense, either in politics or in theory or 
in history. Modernization theory, and the usefulness of the terms "tra-
dition" and "modernity", were seriously discredited. And the stand-
point from which that critique was developed was a Marxist one 
principally. 
So from that point of view, it's been interesting to see social theory, and 
to some extent historical work, recur to this older ground. I can under-
stand it in a variety of ways. I think the crisis in Marxism opened a 
space in which this approach to theorizing the origins of the contempo· 
rary world could return. The discourse of postmodemity has also 
brought these issues back on the agenda, because it requires some seri-
ous effort at theorizing what precedes the "post", and so the modern of 
modernity has found its way back onto the agenda of social and cul-
tural theory. Yet, whether we take Giddens or Bauman or Alexander, or 
any of the other social theorists increasingly holding the central ground 
in critical social science, this return of the modern as the key term for 
understanding the contemporary world and the project of social theory 
is no less problematic than it was thirty years ago, particularly when we 
look at the conceptions of origins that are implied. For instance, 
Giddens talks about modernity in relation to Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution in extraordinarily question-begging ways. Of 
course, Giddens is a highly sophisticated and seductively lucid and au-
thoritative thinker. But once we push past the theory discourse itself, to 
the histories from which modernity supposedly came, we find that 
we're reentering very much the old historical arguments about the En-
lightenment and French Revolution we were in thirty years ago. There's 
a kind of naivete about the historical referents for this incredibly so-
phisticated theory discourse around the modem and modernity, which 
is very ironic. 
There's also a disjunction between a theory discourse of that kind and 
what historians are thinking about. Of course, there are parts of the pro-
fession where those notions of the modem and modernization have 
never been abandoned in the first place, including a powerful and cen-
trally positioned figure like Lawrence Stone (who for several decades 
was a key voice in Past and Present, and dominated a vital and presti-
gious institution of the profession, the Davis Center at Princeton, and 
who polemicized against "postmodemism" from an older ground of 
social science history). But we now have a situation in which a lan-
guage of tradition, traditional society, and modern society can lapse 
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. . we've not begun to reengage questions 
back into place. As h~~o::~; how to conceptualize the history ,of the 
about development a d That's in part because no ones d1s-
last three to four hundre yef arsd. l' to capitalism any more either, 
·ti from eu a ism 
cussing the trans1 ~n ti chema that was available for concep-
and that was the main al.tern~ vl e s ses of change before modernity 
tualizing these grand histonca proces 
d. · s fell out of style. 
iscuss10n . 1 uestions itself. First, what brought you 
dC: Your answer raises_ severa q ? Wh t about the concepts of mo-
into these questions thirty years .ago .1 d ah e first? And have you re-
. h t t you invo ve er · 
dernity and nation t a _go d ' ty ourself? Why not follow 
. the notion of mo em1 y 
ally given up . . th than figures such as Giddens? 
Habermas on this point, ra er . · · 
, d with these questions of history m 
GE: Well, Habermas hasn t engagebl ' h e book at least (Structural 
t · the pu ic sp er ' 
the grand sense- no sin.ce 1989 That's not completely true, be-
Transformation of the Publtc Sphere, ). t ' th political questions of 
. 1 h' ti ual engagemen w1 . 
cause obvious y is con n h t But there's a real dis-h' t · · ·ng t e presen . 
the present is all about. is o~1c1zi we find in the various volumes of his 
junction between the d1scuss1~ns . ttentl and his works of grand 
political essays that appear mte~m1 . t ~st in returning to the ques-
theory. In the latter, there's been little in~ eer with That book on 
tions of historical change that. he behg~t .s csar and othe~s interested in 
. h . . teresting to is onan ' 
the pubhc sp ere is so in and fifteenth centuries and the 
what happens between the ~ou~t~~~th theoretical framework from a 
twentieth century, because it uiH s, a done that again. And he 
hi . 1 proach e s never very careful stonca ap · . f the emergence of moder-
doesn't really engage with thes~ q~esti·~~s 0 So I'm not sure Habermas 
nity in historical terms schematica Y ei er. . · 
. d 'ty at least for historical d1scuss1ons. is the one to save mo erru / h' t 
ti when I began as a is o-But to answer the first part of your _qu~s ohn, that the overall un-
. tt d Marxist m t e sense 
rian I was a pretty commi e . f historical materialism 
. h · h'story 1n terms o derstanding of c ange in 1 . ·mmediate field, Ger-
M · t f entry into my own 1 made sense to me. Y pmn ° 
1
. twentieth centuries, was 
many in the later nineteenth and e~ ier ti 1 Marxisms in the late 
guided by what we ha~ available a~, e~re ltc~ith the crisis in Marx-
sixties and early seventies. But now ve ~a historical conceptions of 
ism by stepping back from these gran · I ublished 
change. If you go back to the Peculiarities of .Ge~r~:1~:i~~1J'as ~ kind of 
an essay called "In Search of the Bourgems et . the late 1980s. That 
k h t tually came ou in supplement to that boo t a even bl f rtable with those big 
was a point where I was still reasona Y.t~omfroom feudalism to capi-
. l t' the trans1 10n terms: the bourgems revo u 1on, ld take from those 
. f h" t . 1 work that one cou talism and the pro1ect o is onca p ,;. hich is the pri-
' . . f the 1859 re;ace, w famous formulations m Marx rom 
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mary text everyone always used to return to, in terms of the contradic-
tions between forces and relations of production. It's one of the clearer 
and more sophisticated statements in Marx describing the base-super-
structure framework and how you can translate that into projects of his-
torical analysis. That essay that came out in the late eighties was the last 
point at which I was comfortable conceptualizing my work, whether in 
the German historical context or elsewhere, in that kind of way. 
Everything that's happened since, in theory and in the world, has made 
it very difficult to proceed in that way, and it's very unclear to me how 
we should deal with those questions now. The critique of grand narra-
tives has made it enormously complicated. For instance, nobody among 
those who would have called themselves Marxists twenty years ago 
talks about the transition debate any more, the transition from feudal-
ism to capitalism, whereas when I came into history in the late sixties 
and early seventies. That's where many of the interesting questions 
were located. As I was learning about the big debates among European 
historians, between the ages of 18 and 25, these were the exciting con-
troversies- the general crisis of the seventeenth century, the rise of the 
world system, the formation of absolutist states, the social interpreta-
tion of the Reformation, as well as the transition debate and the nature 
of bourgeois revolutions-I cut my teeth on. In the meantime, any at-
tempt among historians to understand big political processes of change 
(like the rise of absolutism, the political instabilities of the seventeenth 
century, or the French Revolution) in relation to societal processes of 
development and crisis (like the growth of capitalism) has been under-
mined. The social interpretation of the French Revolution has been sys-
tematically assaulted. There's no shortage of post-Foucauldian grand 
narratives of social power and govemmentality for ordering the histo-
ries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it's true, but this new 
cultural history has very little interest in the relationship of politics to 
social forces in the classical sense, and in any case Foucault had his own 
unreflected assumptions about the relationship of capitalism and the 
rise of the bourgeoisie to the production of the modem. Historical soci-
ologists (Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, John Hall, many others) have 
continued the classical tradition of writing about state formation, but 
by now there's very little engagement of historians per se with this 
project. 
As I mentioned earlier, these notions of modernity have come back in 
social theory, and one of the things I've been trying to do in the las t de-
cade or so is to figure out how they can be sensibly historicized. Other-
wise, they just won't prove tenable for long. So I've spent a lot of time 
with the theory discourse of the postmodern, and with those areas of 
social and cultural theory that have been circulating around these con-
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d modernity, and I've been trying to 
ceptions of the modem an 
historicize them for my own purposes. 
dC: And has this reformulation process greatly changed how you un-
derstand history? · 1 · that's a consequence of my osc1l ation 
GE: To an extent, yes. I suppose h t ld begin this discussion in the 
between the ~ind of geneal~~: :re:~uRevolution, and the kind of ge-
period of Enhghtenment an ld' d would begin· that discussion 
1 th t's more post-Foucau ian an . nea ogy a . th tury with the emphasis on notions 
around the end of the runeteen cen ' d and we have 
of social discipline. Yes, theoretical times have change ' 
all had to change with them. 
Postmodernity and The Pu~lic Spher~ a ostmodem discourse. 
dC: So it sounds like you have hdn_ked up w:~ol:heartedly, or is there 
Do you embrace postmodern iscourse 
some questioning of it for you? . 
. db h tmodernity discuss10n. It 
GE: Sure, I was extremely excite ~ t f e ~~~ine contemporary change 
does seem to me to capture a momen o g d. . 
in precisely the sort of world historical terms we've been iscussmg. 
. try' to figure out the moment 
But having spent really so much time . ing tmodemity one of 
of modernity that logically preceded this one of po~ the ~wer of 
the effects of that is certainly to unsettl~ pretty s:~us~at's ~ew and 
those terms of postmodernity to des~nbe som:s a~tici ation in cul-
specific to the present, because t~ere is enor~o f guriniout what the 
tural history, earlier in the twentieth century. o 1 tualize it is also 
f h ·s how to concep ' 
contemporary moment o c ange i ' t t do in trying to under-
made more complicated by the work I wa~ l~ ;ecedes the present. 
stand the moment of modernity that logica y p 1 . ortant that's 
And I still think that there's something ~:am~ntal .Y i:J'ms of global-
been happening at the end of the twenhetd cenl ury tm start Whether 
. ld be a goo p ace o . 
ization; post-ford1sm wou f hink' bout that contempo-
postmodernity remains a good way o t e of i~~: I was ten years ago. 
rary moment of change, I may be less sur . 
,, ti · a tions in cultural his-
d C: You just mentioned the enormou.s an c1p . here locates it-
tory." Habermas' Structural Transformation of thhe Pbubltkc Spddresses some 
. y essay on t at oo a 
self within cultural history. our b the idea in 
. h b t you seem to em race 
problems with the pubhc sp e~e, u ou find that useful. It 
the end. Can you say something about why yd ·th how Habermas' 
seems that a postmodernist would be concerne ':1 . t 'd 
f blic opiruon seems o avm 
notion of the public sph ere as a bearer 0 pu ·d sonly 
. . db h ·or and focuses on i ea · the question of public action an e avi 
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Do you see any problems with this limited descriptive possibili ty? 
GE: Well, the really useful and exciting thing about Habermas' idea of 
the public sphere to me always had to do with how it was grounded in 
arguments about cultural formation and political development in 
highly materialist ways. If you go back to the public sphere book, the 
argument begins with these notions of transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, and he has a particular model of the formation of commer-
cial society for understanding those transformations. But it begins with 
those big processes of societal change, the growth of markets, the devel-
opment of commerce and all the institutional developments that they 
presuppose in terms of the organization of markets, of communica-
tions, of the creation of newspapers. The Structural Transformation of tire 
Public Sphere is very grounded in these kinds of arguments. So what I 
liked about the Habermas notion of Offentlichkeit and the public sphere 
was that it definitely implied a social history rather than jus t an argu-
ment about ideas. And a lot of the stuff about associational life and the 
circulation of ideas inside a particular infrastructural environment of 
social organization and social exchange is right there in the public 
sphere book. 
dC: Looking back on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
how do you view it as a Marxian historian? 
GE: You know that my essay was originally produced for a conference 
that accompanied the English translation of the public sphere book, in 
September 1989, and part of my charge was to provide some of the 
historicized argumentation for that conference. So it was pretty inter-
esting going back to that book and finding that it so impressively 
grounded in relation to the historical work then available, which wasn't 
all that much, since this was the late 1950s and early 1960s. One of the 
most s triking things for me, when I was doing that work, was the de-
gree to which one could take the best social historical research and writ-
ing that's been done in the meantime, say on eighteenth-century 
Britain, and redescribe it in terms provided by Habermas' book, and 
thereby reformulate the questions posed by Habermas given his his-
torical argumentation. But returning to the earlier concern about the 
public sphere glorifying ideas, it's never about ideas for me, divorced 
from these kinds of social histories. The beauty of the concept is that it 
contained an argumentation about the emergence of modern politics, in 
particular of liberalism and radical democracy- these key terms of 
modern political life- that's precisely grounded in materialist social 
history and a broader conception of public action. 
dC: From what you have said here, it seems as if you are trying to em-
brace both postmodernism and modernism. Let's turn for a moment to 
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. here In your writings, particular in the Pecu-
the notion of modern~ty f · d ' ty seems to play some role in the 
· · · b k the notion o mo emi . " 
lzarities oo ' . D till find the concept of "moderruty 
development of nations . o you s 
useful in this sense? . 
' e moment. One of the problems of the notion of 
GE: Let s. sa:, y:s for th o was that it implied the end of history, that 
"moderruty thirty yearsha'gh . was stabilized in some terminal 
. th oint at w ic society . 
this was . e ~ f desiderata that could be understood in eco-
sen;~~ Ipt ~~~~:~~ ;;:~~tural terms. So long as we ~x~~i~itly danfi~ ~ati.re-
no ' . f th' t rm "moderruty in a e ru on . . . th meaning o is e ' 
fully histoncize ~ d instability and reversibility, it 
that presuppohses incobm~;:t::sys· ~en it has demonstrable usefulness 
seems to me t at may e i ' f h ld in the 
in understanding the histories of E~r~eFand ~;::s~l~tito~ :~~it's cer-
period after the Enlight~nment an t e c~e~~ticulated with notions of 
tainly present and . obvi~usly very u~: more roblematic term, loaded 
progress. Progress is obviously am. . p with the no-
with the d ifficulty of teleological dire~tior:i· Th~ pr~b\ems in the worst 
tion of modernity reflected exactly. th~s kind o te eo ogy itfall for m 
sense of the 1970s-teleological th1nk1ng ~as the wor~!ted to be a~ 
kind of Marxist in the seventies, the last thing we ever resent 
d fl So I think these notions of modernity and progress ~e p cuse o · ht in this conver-
in the kinds of histories we're worried about ng now,. . . . th 
S vided that we h1stoncize m e 
sation on the nineteenth c~ntury · ~ ~;? 
1 
ble But as I said ear-
right way' the concept of moderru ty is sa vagea . ' 
lier, that's very difficult to do. . 
. · b · sly tied up with dC· Th' ti of the pubhc sphere is o v1ou 
. is no on . ( thou h he has abandoned 
Habermas' conception of moderruty even g blic s here it-
that notion of Offentlicl1keit itself). How, ~en, does ~e ~~'m n~t sure I 
self fit into the development and evolution of nations h tu l' ty 
11 bl' sphere" but t e ac a i want to know so much about the term pu ic 1 · e of of public spheres in the construction of nations. ~or elxl.ampt ~' inwi?tnh the 
ti n of the inte igen sia 
your writings, you talk about a connec o h l' k the intelligentsia 
development of nations. Does the public sp ere in 
with the mobilization of the lower classes? 
" bl' h e" for me was always 
GE: Well, the usefulness of the te.rm P~ ic sp e\d t lk about politics 
to do with opening up a space in which we cou a t d' 
that was not subsumed in the conventional institutio~al unders :n :g 





. . . h ' ti' cated in her or is an historian who might be very sop is . 
' . . . t 11 tual when it comes to ex-empirical work but recakitrantly anti-in e ec . h' 
' f th There's a tendency m is-plica ting assumptions or the use o eory. . 
. · 1 . f d by theory in one way or torical work that's not explicit y m orme 
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another to present politics as located in the political process narrowly 
understood-parties, legislatures, government. And I think that is still 
a problem. That is an abiding problem of our contemporary under· 
standing of politics too, in terms of commonsensical understandings. 
What I've always liked about the term "public sphere" as a theory term, 
as a framework that we can take from Habermas, is that it provides a 
way of conceptualizing an expanded notion of the political. It forces us 
to look for politics in other social places. That is useful not only for pro-
ducing these histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It is 
also useful for activating people's sense of their own citizenship now. 
dC: You mean the term public sphere is useful even today in terms of ... 
GE: In terms of being able to say: Look, the "public sphere" is a space 
between state and society in which political action occurs, with real 
effectivities, whether it's in terms of local effects or building a sense of 
political agency, or behaving ethically in one's social relations and al-
lowing some notion of collective goods to be posed, and thereby con-
tributing to wider processes of political mobilization. It's one way of 
making connections between what we think and do in everyday life, in-
cluding the personal sphere, and the world of politics, when in popular 
perceptions politics has been degenerating more and more into a word 
for corruption and self-interestedness and a machinery of privilege, in-
fluence and wheeler-dealing beyond realistic popular control. It's a 
way of restoring intelligibility to the political process in that sense, and 
of reclaiming politics for a realistic discourse of democracy. And that's 
pretty useful in a context where there's depressingly extensive cynicism 
about the ability to have any kind of political effect, where the degree of 
disaffection and cynicism and sense of disablement, politically, or in re-
lation to notions of one's agency as a citizen, when that sense of disable-
ment is so extensive. And I should say here that we owe this ability to 
remake the connections between everydayness and politics especially 
to feminism, and all the ways in which feminist theory and politics 
have turned the relationship of the personal and the political inside out 
since the explosions of 1968. It's feminism that's activated this relation-
ship and allowed Habermas's idea to be redeployed so valuably over 
the past decade. 
So this term "public sphere"- as the starting point for the kind of argu-
mentation we've been alluding to, about what politics is, where it takes 
place, and how it can be understood, as a space available to ordinary 
people and not just the official politicians- this term is a pretty useful 
term for re-energizing a sense of citizenship that's active and can make 
a difference, whether it's the public sphere of particular institutions like 
universities or professions, or local public spheres. So when I said that 
the public sphere makes more sense as a structured setting, where con-
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. ne otiation can occur, that's the kind of thing I had in 
te~tation ~~er ifs historically in relation t? the late eighteenth early 
mmd, w . t mediate p01nt between then and now nineteenth century' or any in er 
want to look at, or whether it's today. 
;~. Thus the notion of everyday politics and the poss~ility ~Hhe~ un-
f ldin in the public sphere is kind of an antidote to e cyruc1sm 
0 
g . . f r to cyru· cism is a good way 
GE. Thinking about it m terms o an answe . . · · ·t · th kind of situations thi k about it. It's a good way of arguing i 'in e . . . 
to find ourselves in-whether it's in a school board, or ma uruversity, 
:: in nthe sort of political process more c~nventiona!ly ;'d~rst:~'t: 
relation to parties and elections, or the articulation o m eres s, And 
resentation of demands at a level of government and ?overnance. life 
p I .d feminists pioneered the importance of making everyday 
:~ o~~cl of politics, whether it's in the family or ~e ~o~~~~e;;~ 
sexuality and personal relations, or all the situations. in wh c . ery 
d th ti n of the public sp ere is a v 
pleasure are produced, an e no o . d of political agency 
ood way of getting from these contexts to an i ea obvi-
g d ti. That' s why it's such an important term for me, and. 
an ac on. 11 of trymg to ously it's linked to notions of civil society, as we as a V-:~Y 
1 
. 
. d fr h·ch pohhca action can conceptualize the ground on which an om w i 
take place. . 
dC: You have a very optimistic way of c?nceptualizing the ~~~~~ 
sphere. Consider instead the Dialectic of Enltg~tenment by H:r~o the 
and Adorno Wouldn't they analyze the public sphere as t .ey . 
· . . tituted by discussions culture industry and dismiss it as an arena cons ld 
that will never have any substantial effect. The public spherehwou 
. h happy because t ey are just be another means of keeping t e masses t 
under the illusion that they can have some effe~t on ~~ governm~; 
and the state of affairs of the world. So, if you still cons1 er yourse a 
Marxist how would you respond to this sort of charge? 
' . 1 th · e and specify the GE: It's always a matter of try1ng to ocate, eon.z / . k 
. . . h' h h or political action can ta e spaces of possibility within w ic c ange . t d 
Place. It's pretty hard to be the kind of optimist that you ~ere JUS e-f . 'f thought this process o scribing. You'd have to be pretty naive i you . . to actual 
getting from the description of the public sphere I JU~t lai~ out 
B t t th same time it seems to me change was a straightforward one. u a e ' 
1 · t · ked has a ways that the Frankfurt School pessimism that you JUS invo . .bl _ 
. kn 1 dge that is tern y arro been a mandarin standpoint of superior ow e . f th 
gant. That doesn't mean those Frankfurt School-informed notionsdo d. e 
. 't ful But they o is-culture industry and repressive tolerance aren use · . d 
d l.f enas for genuine emo-miss popular culture and every ay I e as ar d . 
01 ·an place for man arm cratic agency, and thereby preserve an ympi 
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intellectuals. As you can tell, Lukacs' quip about the grand hotel of de-
spair is one that I still have a lot of sympathy for. 
dC: So Horkheimer or Adorno blasted Jazz as empty expression, lack-
ing the possibility for positive political action. But today that just 
sounds like pompous dismissal of popular cultural activity and perfor-
mance because it doesn't qualify as art. Do you think the postmodern 
turn has amended this conception of popular culture as impotent, 
kitschy everydayness? 
GE: Yes. One of the most important consequences of postmodemism 
and cultural studies is their willingness to take popular culture seri-
ously as a site of political action and engagement, really for the first 
time in the history of the Left. Going back through the last century of 
the history of the Left, it's extremely hard to find any willingness to en-
gage seriously with popular culture in such a way. Even if you go back 
to the period of the formation of socialist parties, you don't find the at-
tempt to get inside popular culture and appreciate its positive capaci-
ties until at least 1968. And postmodernism and cultural studies are 
certainly the academic heirs to the heritage of '68. 
dC: Yet some forms of postmodernism also seem to demand the aban-
donment of grand history, metanarrative, and even the possibili ty of 
radical social change. Doesn't that suggest that postmodernism also 
questions the possibility of political action in everyday activity, per-
haps as much as Horkheimer and Adorno, although for different rea-
sons? 
GE: Well, I'm not sure the one follows from the other. On the one hand, 
we have reason to be skeptical about grand narratives, in large part be-
cause of the difficulty of establishing clear causal relationships in terms 
of the models of determination that were available to us in the Marxist 
tradition. So this skepticism is about political change of the most funda-
mental and far-reaching kinds, whether in the context of revolution or 
long-run structural processes of social development and change. Con-
sequently, theorizing that relationship now that base and superstruc-
ture frameworks are no longer persuasive has fallen into disrepute. 
We've all backed off from that. 
However, that doesn't mean that large-scale political change no longer 
occurs. And one of the extraordinary things about living through the 
last decade has been the reminder that big changes do happen, after all, 
and we shouldn't be fooled by the inevitable disappointments of the 
messiness and limited nature of the democratic advances immediately 
registered after 1989 in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
into concluding that everything has stayed really the same. Quite aside 
from the dramatic legal and constitutional changes of 1989-90 them-
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. d' behind people's f und transforma hons are procee mg 
selves,. proa o s that will only become intelligible gradually and over the 
backs, m w y M 'mmedi'ately the social disordering produced by 
l nger term ore 1 ' 'al' t 
o k ti' ti'o.n and the other negative consequences of postsoc1 is 
mar e za , W E the mean-
transition are certainly the more visible.~ . estern urop~ou h the 
ings of capitalist restructuring an.cl constitutional fchange (d lire and 
Single Europe legislation, Maastr1cht, and EMU) or everyh ay tur I 
ractical citizenship are even harder to grasp. But bey?~d t e struc a 
Ph · E t and West the imacrinative space of politics has als? b~en 
c anges m as / o· 'b'l'ty f thinkmg 
f undly opened up and the conditions of possi ii or al 
pro o . ~ . d ul r improvements are -
differently about pohhcal action an pop ~ th d of 
read bein assembled. The end of Commurusm also means . e en 
anti-~omm~nism, and in the absence of that enon:nous constramt forms 
of radicalism become potentially viable once again. 
On the other hand therefore, this reemphasizes the i~portru:ce of those 
moments of trans~ational change--constitution-makmg con1unc~es-
we talked about earlier on. We need to rerr;e~~;;_~~e ~i:pl;:sul=~ 
pean-wide dimensions of the events o . . . in terms 
institutional changes at the European level are still developm~, f E _ 
. · · E t E rope the strengthening 0 u 
Of post-socialist transition in as em u ' fu th . t 11 
· 1 · d ·ts r er ms a -ropean integration through the 1992 legis a~o~ a_n i f d li . the 
. f s of incipient e era sm, ments· the monetary uruon; orm h h d 
reconflguring of NATO, and so forth. These develop~ents abve a_ 
. l' ti f how politics can econ profound consequences and imp ica . ons . or N t onl is there 
ducted within national and local settings m Europe. 0 Y
1 
b . 
massive political change taking place in the p~esent, ~here ~re ~ so ~h::~ 
ously ways of theorizing and underst~nd1ng an ana yzing 
changes in relation to capitalist restructuring. 
. 1 d in very specific local This can be done both in transnationa terms an . ll d 
· h b ome so demographica Yan contexts since local economies ave ec h . 1 h · changes ere m structurally transformed. Take for instance t e massive. h T t 
. y 've got this uge oyo a 
Lexington over the past twenty yea~s. 0~ 
11 
sorts of im lications 
plant and an expanding local population, with a ht b p t (As it 
for how social life and local politics have to be th~u~ a ou · B _ 
h 1 p in Britain, between ur happens, the local economy w ere gre~ u tted an older industrial 
ton-on-Trent and Derby, where Thatchensm gu th tr _ 
1 b tructured by e cons uc economy during the 1980s, has a so een res f h 
l ) Th re obviously changes o uge tion of a massive Toyota pant · ese a . 
11 magnitude. Whether such changes occur locally, na~~nal y,ti. or 
. k h h the forms of poh ti ca ac on transnationally we have to thin t roug d f 
, tu l hanges an trans or-and agency that might connect to those struc ra c of think-
mations. And the Public Sphere seems ~o me an.excellent. wa~ with the 
ing about this field of possible connections, which also hes 
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contemporary project of the Left's rethinking popular culture along 
postmodern lines. We don't get very far in specifying the kinds of poli· 
tics that work in this new environment if we just stick with the strate-
gies and concepts that are given to us by the tradition, whether 
Marxism, other radicalisms, or social democracy. On the other hand, if 
we acknowledge that politics is located elsewhere now, that doesn't 
mean that all of those given concepts and strategies are obsolete. I cer-
tainly don't think, for example, that class has become an inoperative 
term of politics. It's the insufficiencies of those given terms that need to 
be faced and rethought. 
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